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Introduction
Carl von Clausewltz, the 19th century mthtary theonst, warned that m warfare "simple thmgs are dtfficult " The same prmctple apphes to efforts to close rmlitary bases in the post-Cold War era
The collapse of commumsm and dlsmtegratton of the Soviet Umon lefi a dimmished threat and precipitated a reduction m the size of the US anned forces The mrhtary base structure desrgned to accomodate a much larger Cold War force could no longer be mamtamed, especially in a much constramed budget environment There seemed to be a general consensus across the natron that base consolidation and closure could cut fat, without affectmg the muscle of the armed forces
The sltuatlon seemed simple, the logic appeared abundantly clear Yet, the executive and legislatrve branches of government were unable to achieve a mutually agreeable plan to close bases Thrs sltuatlon exrsted for several key reasons First, under our Constmmonal system of separate mstltutrons sharing power, neither branch of government could close bases wtthout approval from the other Second, the executrve branch opposed Congresstonal mfluence over therr percetved Constnuttonal nghts to manage the day-to-day operations of the armed forces They also questioned Congressional motivatrons on thrs matter Specifically, they were concerned that Congressmen would select bases to close based on parochial rather than national interests Interestmgly enough, Congress held the same Mew of the executit-e Third, members of Congress were reluctant to act because closmg a base m a Congressman's dlstnct or state would surely raise severe objectrons from then affected constituents Failure to oppose such an action would be a sure form of politrcal surcrde for the member of Congress Addmonally, Congressronal procedure provides great powers to mdrvTdua1 members who could halt the whole system over a base closure issue Finally,
Congressmen are loathe to support any action that would * hurt a fellow member, partrcularly rf they are m the same polrtlcal party Thts combmatron of factors, which ulll be discussed m more detarl later, served to create an unusual situation m whtch it was tmposslble for these separate mstituttons sharmg power to achieve a compromise solutron
As a result of thrs impasse, the Congress created the Base Realignment and Closure
Corrmnsslon (BFUC) The BRAC was an independent commrsslon designed to relieve the executive and legislative branches of government of the pohtlcally onerous task of deciding which bases to close -More rmportantly, it advanced the process by procedurally forcmg the President and Congress either to approve or disapprove the BRAC closure list in its entirety To date, there have been three rounds of BIUC proceedings, each of which has been approved by both branches of government System (PPBS) This IS a highly complex process that depends upon matchmg resource requirements wth avalabie fimds SECDEF's are keenly aware that the sue and composition of the defense budget may affect the health of the whole US economy, and the level of defense spending is often a major issue in debates over national pnonties 6 Dunng the present tight fiscal times, the SECDEF's objective must be to get the most bang for every buck He knows that operating excess bases at partial strength will consume lumted resources at the expense of readmess, mf?astructure, and modermzatron efforts ' Therefore, he strongly believes that he should have the authonty, through the President, to posture forces m the most cost effective manner and close unnecessary bases, if necessary, to achieve that objective Finally, SECDEF's mamtam that they know better than anyone else v+mch bases should be closed, and tend to forcefully oppose "less informed" and their future was at stake could not sacrifice themselves, and Congressmen absolutely could not acquiesce to a base closure m their districts and survive politlcally These dynarmcs shape the debate The point is not whether each actor is rrght or wrong, but that these obstacles are absolute
The system of separate institutions sharing power demands a solution legslated by the Congress, approved by the President and executed by the DOD In thus case, the government was unable to act and a strategy was requued to break the gndlock The national interest demanded it and the
BRAC provided it
The B&K's design was ingenious It allowed the actors to "play in the process," wtule absolving themselves of the blame for indlvldual base closures, yet sti accomplishing the objective According to BRAC rules, pohticians must approve or reject the package of base closure recommendations as a whole They cannot remove mdividual bases from the list In practice, the packages were carefUlly crafted so that a majority of the lawmakers were not affected and thus voted to sustain the list At the same time, the minonty whose constituents would suffer could go back home and say, \+lth a clear conscience, that they did all they could to oppose the effort mcludmg voting against it " Representative Les Aspm (D-WI) said of the first hst "about two dozen members were hit More than a hundred are breathing a sigh of relief [The latter] now have a vested interest m seeing the list go through "2~ Thus 1s a critical part of the process because it prevents indlvldual
Congressmen from holding up the system, while allowmg the majonty to avoid the dilemma of voting agamst fellow members TIus effeavely forces Congress to bypass the normal system of mutual support, returmng favors, and backscratchmg Addmonally, the process lusts time for debate, precludes Senatonal fillbuster, and prevents adding any amendments These important procedural '-I Donlan Thomas Eamnw the Peace DI\ldend Earrons. 14 Jan 94 pg 10 " Congressional Quarterly 3 1 Dee SS pg 3615 rules msure timely action and provide political protection for individual members on both sides of the issue
The executive branch provides data to the BRAC during their research and deliberation phases of the process However, once the base closure list is complete, the executive branch cannot amend rt and must act wnhm a specified timeframe to approve the entire list This serves the same purpose as tt did for the Congress and facilitates a similar response As a result, Presidents have been free of the political obstacles presented earlier, and have quickly approved each of the three hsts proposed thus far
Our government normally runs on the successful compromrse and coordination expected of the Constitutional concept of separate mstitutlons shanng power However, when obstacles are so formidable that they prevent the system from worlong as it was intended to, then an external stimulus is required Author Thomas Donlan said "the BRAC gave members of Congress the political cover they needed to do what was nght for the whole nation "= Mr Jim Courter added that "yielding to such a commission absolves our representatives of responsibility and insulates them from the wrath of the voters and the power of the bureaucracy Just look at those areas of gndlock Look at those areas where there is institutional incapability of solving a protracted problem that everybody recogmzes has to be solved, and in those situations, apply this type of commtssion, and it worked, I thmk, m base closing The BRAC process has helped us do what we hate to do but which we all know has to be done"24 This is not a debate about nght or wrong, it is Instead an analysis about what works Clearly, the BRAC was the only feasible strategy to close nulnary bases m the postCold War era 13 DonIan. pg 10 " Courter James Address to a Xatlonal Press Club Luncheon Rcutcrs 5 Xhr 9;
